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ABSTRACT
We examine the open macroeconomic policy choices of developing economies from the perspective
of the economic “trilemma” hypothesis. We construct an index of divergence of the three trilemma
policy choices, and evaluate its patterns in recent decades. We find that the three dimensions of the
trilemma configurations are converging towards a “middle ground” among emerging market economies
-- managed exchange rate flexibility underpinned by sizable holdings of international reserves, intermediate
levels of monetary independence, and controlled financial integration. Emerging market economies
with more converged policy choices tend to experience smaller output volatility in the last two decades.
Emerging markets with relatively low international reserves/GDP could experience higher levels of
output volatility when they choose a policy combination with a greater degree of policy divergence.
Yet this heightened output volatility effect does not apply to economies with relatively high international
reserves/GDP holding.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental contribution of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the impossible trinity,
or the Trilemma. The Trilemma states that a country may simultaneously choose any two, but
not all of the following three policy goals – monetary independence, exchange rate stability and
financial integration. Among Mundell’s seminal contributions in the 1960s was the derivation of
the Trilemma in the context of an open economy extension of the IS-LM Neo-Keynesian model.
The model considers a small country choosing its exchange rate regime and its financial
integration with the global financial market. Analysis is considerably simplified by focusing on
polarized binary choices, i.e., credibly fixed exchange rate or pure float, and prefect capital
mobility or financial autarky.1 This hypothesis has been widely taught and recognized since it is
quite intuitive and helpful to understand the constraints policy makers must face in an open
economy setting.
Theory tells us that each one of the three trilemma policy choices can be a double-edged
sword, which should explain the wide and mixed variety of empirical findings on each of the
three policy choices. Significant recent literature recognized these issues.2 To make the matter
more complicated, while there are three ways of pairing two out of the three policies, the effect
of each policy choice can differ depending on what the other policy choice it is paired with. For
example, exchange rate stability can be more destabilizing when it is paired with financial
openness while it can be stabilizing if paired with greater monetary autonomy. Hence, it may be
worthwhile to empirically analyze the three types of policy combinations in a comprehensive and
systematic manner.
Furthermore, countries rarely face the stark polarized binary choices envisioned by the
original Trilemma. Instead, countries operate in the range of the ‘generalized Trilmma
configuration’ -- partial financial integration, controlled exchange rate flexibility, and a degree of
monetary independence. Understanding these mixed regimes remains a challenge, as there is no
unique way to define and measure the degree the three Trilemma variables. Proper modeling of
1

For overview of Mundell’s works see The Prize in Economics 1999 - Press Release
(http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1999/press.html) or Mundell (1961, 1963). See
Aizenman (2011) for overview of the research dealing with the trilemma.
2
As for monetary independence, refer to Obstfeld, et al. (2005) and Frankel et al. (2004). On the impact of the
exchange rate regime, refer to Ghosh et al. (1997), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), and Eichengreen and
Leblang (2003). The empirical literature on the effect of financial liberalization is surveyed by Edison et al. (2002),
Henry (2006), Kose et al. (2006), Prasad et al. (2003), and Prasad and Rajan (2008).
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limited financial integration and limited substitutability of assets and testing the Trilemma in a
generalized or systematic manner have been still work in progress. Yet, even in this murky
situation, the Trilemma remains a potent paradigm since policy makers are challenged by the
scarcity of independent policy instruments.
Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008, 2010, 2011) developed a set of the “trilemma indexes”
that measure the degree of achievement in each of the three policy choices for a wide coverage
of countries and years. They measure the degree to which each of the three policy choices is
implemented by economies for more than 170 economies for 1970 through 2007.3 The monetary
independence index (MI) is based on the correlation of a country’s interest rates with the base
country’s interest rate. The index for exchange rate stability (ERS) is an invert of exchange rate
volatility, i.e., standard deviations of the monthly rate of depreciation, using the exchange rate
between the home and base economies. The degree of financial integration is measured with the
Chinn-Ito (2006, 2008) capital controls index (KAOPEN). 4
Using the indexes, they empirically proved that the hypothesis is valid by showing that
the three measures of the trilemma are linearly related to each other. In this paper, using the
“trilemma indexes” first introduced in Aizenman, et al. (2008), we focus on characterizing the
policy choices based on the trilemma taken by a group of emerging market economies (EMGs).5
While developing countries account for more than half of the global GDP, the EMGs –
composed mostly of middle- to high-income countries (but excluding traditional industrialized
countries) with high degrees of trade, and sometimes financial, openness – account for 40% of
the global population and have been growing at a much faster rate than the industrialized
countries or other non-emerging market developing countries in the last few decades. Despite
oft-observed vulnerabilities due to higher volatility of terms of trade, greater exposure to
commodity prices shocks, lower financial depth, and frequently polarized society, the economic
performance of these economies has been impressive. That suggests that the benefit of optimal
choices of the Trilemma policies must be significant for these economies.

3

The data are updated to 2010 for monetary independence and exchange rate stability and to 2009 for financial
openness. The indexes are available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/trilemma_indexes.htm.
4
Refer to Appendix for the details of construction of the indexes. The methodology outlined in these papers has
been applied and extended to several studies, including Hutchison, Sengupta, and Singh (2011), Cortuk and Singh
(2011), and Popper, Mandilaras, and Bird (2011).
5
The emerging market countries (EMGs) are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during
the period of 1980-1997 by the International Financial Corporation plus Hong Kong and Singapore.
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Among EMGs, we particularly focus on a characteristic of their trilemma policies that
have been evident in recent decades. That is the tendency for the “middle-ground convergence” –
emerging market economies tend to choose a policy combination composed of intermediate
levels of all three policies. Using the trilemma indexes, we provide a metric that measures the
degree of divergence among the three trilemma policies, and show that the middle-ground
convergence tends to be more evident among Asian EMGs. We also provide evidence that a
country equipped with intermediate levels of the three trilemma policies tend to experience a
lower level of output volatility. That may explain the recent tendency of middle-ground
convergence among emerging market economies.
Interestingly, for the emerging market economies, the indexes suggest a convergence
toward the middle ground, even as talk of the disappearing middle has been doing the rounds.
This pattern of results suggests that emerging market economies may have been trying to cling to
moderate levels of both monetary independence and financial openness while maintaining higher
levels of exchange rate stability. In other words, they have been leaning somewhat against the
trilemma over a period that interestingly coincides with the time when some of these economies
began accumulating sizable international reserves (IR), potentially to buffer the trade-off arising
from the trilemma. These observations are particularly applicable to Asian EMGs, but not to
non-emerging developing market economies. For the latter group of economies, exchange rate
stability has been the most aggressively pursued policy throughout the period. In contrast to the
experience of the emerging market economies, financial liberalization has not been proceeding
rapidly for the non-emerging market developing economies.

2.

The Index of Policy Convergence
To see how much convergence is taking place, we propose to calculate a new variable

that measures the extent of divergence in all three trilemma indexes. The measure of triad policy
divergence dit is calculated as follows:

_
where _

1

_

for X = MI, ERS, and KAOPEN, and
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1

_

1

is cross-country average of X in year t.

Figure 1 illustrates the average of dit for different subgroups of countries based on income
levels. We can make several interesting observations based on this figure. For the last two
decades, advanced economies tend to have combinations of distinctive policies. Not surprisingly,
the Euro country group has the highest degree of policy divergence among the country groups,
followed by the group of non-Euro advanced economies. The group of emerging market
economies has had the lowest degree of policy convergence in the last two decades. Since the
beginning of the 1980s, developing economies, whether or not with emerging markets, have had
relatively stable movement in the degree of policy convergence except for the mid-1990s when
both subgroups of developing economies experienced a drop in the degree of policy divergence.
In the crisis years of 1982, 1997-98, and 2008-09 – the Mexican debt crisis, the Asian financial
crisis, and the global financial crisis, interestingly, the policy convergence measure tends to fall
in the years prior to the crisis years.
To see what is driving the trajectories in Figure 1, we look at the group mean of the ratios
of each of the three indexes to its cross-country mean (i.e.,

X it
Xt

for monetary policy

independence (MI), exchange rate stability (ERS), and financial openness (KAOPEN)).6 We
focus our discussions on developing economies and report the average ratios for emerging
market economies and non-emerging market developing economies in Figures 2 and 3,
respectively.
These figures show clear differences between emerging market economies and nonemerging market developing economies. First, from the beginning of the sample period through
the end of the 1990s, it is exchange rate stability that non-emerging market developing
economies have prioritized while emerging market economies have pursued monetary
independence during the same period. Second, despite the prevalent anecdotal view that
emerging market economies have pursued greater exchange rate stability, it has not been given
the first priority over the sample period. Third, most distinctively from the non-emerging market
group, emerging market economies have increased the extent of financial openness very rapidly
in the last two decades. Fourth, while non-emerging market developing economies increased the
extent of monetary independence in the first half of the 2000s, the opposite is true for emerging

6

The cross country average ( X t ) is the sample average of X including the industrialized countries for year t.
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market economies. However, facing the global financial crisis of 2008-09, emerging market
economies rapidly regained monetary independence.
We are also curious to see if there are any regional characteristics in the formation of
triad open macro policies. Externality can play a role in concerting policy decision makings
among neighboring countries in a region while possibly increasing the cost of shying away from
regional policy coordination. Furthermore, there can be a regional economic integration such as
in the case of East Asian supply chain network or a monetary policy arrangement as in the case
of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Hence, comparison among geographical groups of
countries should shed another ray of light on the differences in the characteristics of triad open
macro policies among countries. Figure 4 illustrates the averages of the policy dispersion
measure (dit) for different regional country groups.
One interesting observation we can make is that both Asian emerging market economies
and countries in the middle-east and northern Africa experienced high levels of policy
divergence from the beginning of the 1980s through the early 1990s. This is mainly because the
countries in both regional groups achieved higher levels of financial opening compared to the
average of developing economies.7 More interestingly, since the last few years of the 1990s,
which coincides with the Asian Crisis period, the degrees of policy divergence have been
persistently small among all regional groups. This policy convergence among developing
economies may reflect the great moderation, but the convergence seems to be still in place in the
last few years of the sample that corresponds to the years of the global financial crisis. Lastly,
despite its high levels of policy divergence in the 1980s, emerging market economies in Asia
have been experiencing lowest levels of policy divergence in the last decade. Aizenman, Chinn,
and Ito (2011) examined econometrically how the triad open macro policy combinations can
affect macroeconomic performances such as output growth and volatility, inflation, and inflation
volatility. They concluded that the policy combinations implemented by emerging market
economies in Asia have allowed these economies to experience low levels of output volatility.
The figures here suggest that the “middle-ground convergence” of the triad open macro policies
may also have contributed to the stability of these economies’ output performances.

7

Plus, Latin American countries, many of which went through debt crises, retrenched financial openness around the
same period, dragging down the average.
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3. Effect of Policy Convergence
Given that Asian emerging market economies, as well as developing economies in
general, were barely affected by the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the high degree of policy
convergence we observe for developing economies, especially emerging market economies, may
have also contributed to more stable output performances of developing economies. We focus on
this issue in this section.
An economy with its triad open macro policies clustered around the intermediate levels,
as is the case with many emerging market economies, may be able to retain stability in its output
performance. By avoiding a policy combination of distinctive choices among the three open
macro policies, the economy may be able to dampen the negative aspects of each of the three
policy choices we discussed in a previous section. If that is true, we can expect smaller dit’s to be
correlated with smaller output volatilities.
Figure 5 displays a scatter diagram for the correlation between five-year standard
deviations of per capita output growth (in local currency) and the five-year average of the policy
divergence measure d for non-overlapping five-year panels from 1970 through 2009.8 The gray
triangles are for the group of non-emerging market developing economies whereas the black
diamonds are for emerging market economies. Both subsamples have slightly positive
correlation coefficients as our prior suggested, but both coefficients are insignificant.
For the last two decades, some of the developing economies have been actively opening
up their financial markets. One other prior we can make is that countries may try to have a
smaller degree of policy divergence to be prepared for potential negative consequences of
financial liberalization. If that is true, more financially open economies may experience smaller
output volatility when they adopt a policy combination with smaller policy divergence. Let us
see if the data are consistent with this prior.
Figure 6 again illustrates the correlation between output volatility and the measure of
policy divergence, but now the sample is divided into two groups: financial open economies and
financial closed economies. A country is categorized as a financial open economy if its measure
of financial openness is greater than the average of the measure among developing economies in
a particular year. Financially open economies are shown in black diamonds and financially

8

The five-year standard deviations of per capita output growth that are above the 99th percentile are considered to be
outliers and removed from presentation.
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closed economies are in gray triangles. As we suspected, financially open economies have a
positive, but insignificant, correlation between output volatility and policy dispersion whereas
financially closed economies have a slightly negative, insignificant correlation. The p-value of
the positive correlation is now 28%, much lower than that for the negative correlation.
What if we focus on the time period when developing economies, especially those with
emerging markets, have been actively liberalizing financial markets? Figure 7 is a recreation of
Figure 5, but we now restrict the sample to the 1990-2009 period. We see a clear difference
between emerging market economies and non-emerging market economies. Emerging market
economies with lower levels of policy dispersion measure tend to experience lower levels of
output volatility – the correlation coefficient is significant with a conventional significance level.
Non-emerging market economies, on the other hand, tend to experience higher levels of output
volatility if they pursue lower levels of policy dispersion though the correlation coefficient is
only marginally significant. It appears that emerging market economies have dealt with financial
globalization better than non-emerging market developing economies by having more converged
policy combinations.
Figure 8 is a recreation of Figure 6, but focusing on emerging market economies in the
1990-2009 period. Emerging market countries without open financial markets have a
significantly positive and high correlation between policy convergence and output volatility
while those with open financial markets have an insignificantly positive correlation (with a
smaller magnitude). This result can be counter-intuitive for those who believe that an economy
can experience a turbulence if it pursues greater financial openness and a more distinctively
divergent policy combination.

4. The Trilemma to The Quadrilemma?
Open macroeconomic management is never an easy task especially for developing
countries. Those economies that have decided to pursue greater financial openness have to be
prepared for financial turbulences associated with sudden stops of inflows of capital, capital
flights, and deleveraging crises. One byproduct of pursuit for greater financial openness while
retaining financial and economic stability is rapid accumulation of international reserves among
developing economies. As many researchers have pointed out, developing countries, especially
emerging market economies, have increased the amount of international reserves holding
8

significantly in recent years. While the international reserves/GDP ratio of industrial countries
was overall stable, hovering below 10%, the reserves/GDP ratio of developing countries
increased dramatically, close to tripling in 25 years. By 2007, about two thirds of the global
international reserves were held by developing countries. Most of this increase has been in Asia.
The most dramatic changes occurred in the China, increasing its reserve/GDP from below 5% in
1980, to about 50% in 2009. As has been widely discussed, a rapid increase in international
reserves holding, especially in Asia, started in the post-Asian crisis period, suggesting that
insurance motives are one of the motivations for developing economies to hold massive
international reserves (Aizenman and Marion 2003).9
Before financial liberalization became more of a general trend for developing countries in
the 1990s, the demand for reserves provided self-insurance almost merely against volatile trade
flows. However, as financial liberalization efforts created externality among developing
countries, leading to abundant but volatile capital flows across countries, countries started
finding a strong need to self-insure against volatile financial flows. By the nature of financial
markets, the exposure to rapidly increasing demands for foreign currency triggered by financial
volatility, exceeds by a wide margin the one triggered by trade volatility. The East Asian crisis
was a watershed event, as it impacted high saving countries with overall balanced fiscal accounts.
These countries were viewed as being less exposed to sudden stop events as compared with other
developing countries prior to the crisis. With a lag, the affected countries reacted by massive
increases in their stock of reserves.
Recent studies validate the importance of “financial factors” as key determinants, in
addition to the traditional trade factors, in accounting for increased international reserves/GDP
ratios. Indeed, recent research has revealed that the role of financial factors has increased in
tandem with growing financial integration. More financially open, financially deep countries,
with greater exchange rate stability tend to hold more reserves. Within the emerging market
sample, the fixed exchange rate effect is weaker, but financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) is
highly significant and growing in importance over time (Cheung and Ito 2009, Obstfeld et al.
2010). Trade openness is the other robust determinant of reserve demand, though its importance
9

These economies also cannot expect stable access to the international financial market to the same extent of
advanced economies (Obstfeld, et al. 2009). Further, distaste among developing countries for rescue programs
offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the Asian crisis of 1997-98could have also motivated these
economies to be prepared for a rainy day on their own.
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seems to have diminished over time (Cheung and Ito 2009). The growing importance of financial
factors helps in accounting for a greater share of the international reserves/GDP ratios
(Aizenman and Lee 2007). These results are in line with a broader self-insurance view, where
reserves provide a buffer both against deleveraging initiated by foreign parties and against the
sudden wish of domestic residents to acquire new external assets. That is, developing countries
often face “sudden capital flight” (Calvo 1998, 2006; Aizenman and Lee 2007) in the form of
“double drains” or “external and internal drains” (Obstfeld, et al. 2009).10
All these issues suggest that developing countries may need to manage their open macro
policies on the basis of the “quadrilemma” rather than the trilemma.
The “diamond charts” in Figure 9 are useful to trace the changing patterns of the
“quadrilemma” configurations. Each country’s configuration at a given instant is summarized by
a “generalized diamond,” whose four vertices measure monetary independence, exchange rate
stability, IR/GDP ratio, and financial integration. The origin has been normalized so as to
represent zero monetary independence, pure float, zero international reserves, and financial
autarky. The panels of figures summarize the trends for industrialized economies, emerging
Asian economies, non-emerging market developing Asian economies, non-Asian developing
economies, and Latin American emerging market economies in the last four decades.
In Figure 9, we can observe again the divergence of the trilemma configurations for the
industrial economies over the years—a move toward deeper financial integration, greater
exchange rate stability, and weaker monetary independence—while reducing the level of IR
holding over years. Asia, especially those economies with emerging markets, appears distinct
from other groups of economies; the middle-ground convergence observed for the emerging
market group is quite evident for this particular group of economies. This is not a recent
phenomenon for the Asian emerging market economies, however. Since as early as the 1980s,
the three indexes have been clustered around the middle range, though exchange rate stability
has been the most pervasive policy choice and the degree of monetary independence has been
gradually declining. This characterization is not applicable to the other groups of developing
economies such as Latin American emerging market economies. Most importantly, the group of
Asian emerging market economies stands out from the others with their sizeable and rapidly
10

The high positive co-movement of international reserves and M2 is consistent with the view that the greatest
capital flight risks are posed by the most liquid assets, i.e., by the liquid liabilities of the banking system as
measured by M2 (Cheung and Ito, 2009).
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increasing amount of IR holding, making one suspect potential implications of such IR holdings
on trilemma policy choices and macroeconomic performances.
Aizenman, et al. (2010) empirically show that pursuing greater exchange stability can be
increasing output volatility for developing economies, but that that can be mitigated by holding a
greater amount of international reserves than the threshold of about 20% of GDP. Aizenman, et
al. (2011) find that Asian emerging market economies seem to have adopted a policy
combination of the three trilemma policies and international reserves that allow these economies
to lessen output volatility through reduced real exchange volatility. Given most of Asian
emerging market economies are quite open to international trade, implementing a set of open
macro policies that helps reduce the volatility of real exchange rates is quite important.11 Thus, it
is not surprising for developing economies to have become active in accumulating international
reserves in recent years.
Let us now examine the impact of holding international reserves in the context of policy
convergence. Figure 10 again displays a scatter diagram for the correlation between output
volatility and the measure of policy divergence for emerging market economies in the 1990-2009
period. The sample is divided into two subgroups: one composed of emerging market economies
that hold international reserves more than the annual median level among developing countries
and the other of those economies with reserves lower than the median. Those emerging market
economies with lower levels of international reserves have a significantly positive correlation
while those with higher levels of reserves have an insignificantly negative association. One
interpretation of this result is that holding high levels of international reserves may give countries
a wider choice for the degree of policy divergence. For countries with low international reserves,
it is better to have a more convergence, but high reserve holders do not face the same kind of
trade-off.
What if we restrict the sample to those emerging market economies that have more open
financial markets? Figure 11 is the same as Figure 10, except that the sample is now restricted to
only emerging market economies with more open financial markets (“open” as defined in Figure
11

More particularly, Aizenman, et al. (2011) also show that an emerging market economy pursuing greater
exchange rate stability and greater financial openness (i.e., weaker monetary independence) while holding a massive
amount of IR (exceeding 15–20% of GDP) can experience higher volatility in investment but lower volatility in real
exchange rates. However, for economies that are more open to trade, the benefit of lower real exchange rate
volatility outweigh the cost of higher investment volatility, signifying the importance of holding massive
international reserves.
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6). The figures illustrates that emerging market economies with more open financial markets
may face higher levels of output volatility if they pursue higher degrees of policy divergence but
do not hold high levels of international reserves, though the positive association is not
statistically significant. For emerging market economies with more open financial markets and
high levels of international reserves, the level of policy divergence does not seem to have an
effect on output volatility levels.
Having seen these results, we can conclude not only that the tendency for emerging
market economies to have more converged policy combinations help them to experience lower
levels of output volatility, but also that holding a higher level of international reserves may help
them to get prepared for a future choice of policies that are more distinctively different from each
other.
Now that we know holding high levels of IR may allow countries to have a wider range
of policy divergence than those without and may help those with wider policy divergence to
avoid experiencing higher output volatility, we wonder how emerging market economies
performed during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Although the epicenter of the crisis was
not in any emerging market economies but in the advanced economies (mostly the United States),
emerging market economies could have been exposed to contagion from the crisis. However,
except for a few emerging market economies in Eastern Europe, most of emerging market
economies were barely affected by the crisis. In such circumstances, we wonder what was the
role of international reserves holding for emerging market economies.
Figures 12 and 13 are helpful to answer this question. Figure 12 shows the correlation
between output volatility and the degree of policy divergence for the group of emerging market
economies but only for the five-year period of 2005 through 2009 which correspond to the years
prior to and during the global financial crisis. In the figure, we see again that the correlation is
weaker for the countries that hold higher levels of international reserves – while the correlation is
significantly positive for the low IR holders with a conventional significance level, that for the
high IR holders is small and insignificant.12
The effect of holding IR should be greater for those economies with more open financial
markets. Hence, we restrict our sample to only those economies with more open financial
markets (as defined previously) and show the result in Figure 13. The result is clear; those
12

The result is independent of whether or not Lithuania, a clear outlier with its high output volatility, is included.
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economies which do not hold high levels of IR experienced higher levels of output volatility if
they have trilemma policy combinations with a greater degree of divergence.13 The high IR
holders on average do not face such a positive correlation. Compared to Figure 12, the
magnitude of the correlation is higher, suggesting that countries with more open financial
markets and higher degrees of policy divergence would have to face higher levels of output
volatility if they do not hold high levels of IR. With these results, high levels of IR holding may
be one of the reasons for emerging market economies to be able to avoid contagion from the
outbreak of the global financial crisis.

5. Concluding Remarks
We have examined the development of open macroeconomic policy choices among
developing economies from the perspective of the powerful hypothesis of the “trilemma” – a
country may not simultaneously pursue the full extent of achievement in all of the three policy
goals of monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness. Using the
metrics introduced by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010), or the “trilemma indexes,” that measure
the extent of achievement in each of the three policy choices, we have observed several
interesting characteristics of the international monetary system.
There are striking differences in the choices that industrialized and developing countries
have made over the 1970-2009 period. More importantly, recent trends suggest that among
emerging market countries, i.e., those countries that are not traditional advanced countries but
with middle or high levels of income and are open to international trade, the three dimensions of
the trilemma configurations are converging towards a “middle ground” with managed exchange
rate flexibility, underpinned by sizable holdings of international reserves, and intermediate levels
of monetary independence and financial integration. Industrialized countries, on the other hand,
have been experiencing divergence of the three dimensions of the trilemma and moved toward
the combination of higher exchange rate stability and financial openness and low monetary
independence (most clearly exemplified by the advent of the euro).
We also focused on the characteristics of the “middle-ground convergence” among
emerging market economies. When we examined the correlation between the measure of policy
13

Again, the positive correlation is significant irrespective of Lithuania.
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divergence and the level of output volatility, we found that emerging market economies with
more converged policy choices tend to experience smaller output volatility in the last two
decades. In a world with rapidly proceeding financial globalization, financial liberalization can
be a risky policy for developing economies, raising the importance of holding a large amount of
international reserves as it has happened in the last decade. On that issue, we found some
evidence that emerging markets with low levels of international reserves holding could
experience higher levels of output volatility when they choose a policy combination with a
greater degree of policy divergence while it does not apply to economies with high levels of
international reserves holding. This result may indicate that holding a high volume of
international reserves may give room to emerging market economies to choose a policy
combination from a wider spectrum of policy combinations.
We also found that this generalization is also true for emerging market economies during
the period around the global financial crisis of 2008-09. In the 2005-09 period, economies with
high levels of IR holding do not seem to have faced the positive correlation between policy
divergence and output volatility while the correlation is quite evident for those economies which
did not hold high levels of IR. These results may indicate that high levels of IR holding may be
one of the reasons for emerging market economies to be able to avoid contagion from the
outbreak of the global financial crisis.

14

Appendix: Construction of the Trilemma Indexes

Monetary Independence (MI)
The extent of monetary independence is measured as the reciprocal of the annual correlation
between the monthly interest rates of the home country and the base country.14 Money market rates are
used for the calculation.15
The index for the extent of monetary independence is defined as:
MI = 1 

corr (ii , i j )  1
2

where i refers to home countries and j to the base country. By construction, the maximum value is 1, and
the minimum value is 0. Higher values of the index mean more monetary policy independence.16,17
Here, the base country is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is most
closely linked with as in Shambaugh (2004). The base countries are Australia, Belgium, France, Germany,
India, Malaysia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the countries and years for
which Shambaugh’s data are available, the base countries from his work are used, and for the others, the
base countries are assigned based on the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and Central Intelligence Agency Factbook.
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)
To measure the extent of exchange rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly
exchange rate between the home country and the base country are calculated and included in the
following formula to normalize the index between 0 and 1:

14

The base country is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is most closely linked with, as
defined in Shambaugh (2004). The base countries are Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South
Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. For the countries and years for which Shambaugh’s data are available, the base
countries from his work are used, and for the others, the base countries are assigned based on IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and CIA Factbook.
15
The data are extracted from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (60B..ZF...). For the countries whose
money market rates are unavailable or extremely limited, the money market data are supplemented by those from
the Bloomberg terminal and also by the discount rates (60...ZF...) and the deposit rates (60L..ZF...) series from IFS.
16
The index is smoothed out by applying the 3-year moving averages encompassing the preceding, concurrent, and
following years (t – 1, t, t+1) of observations.
17
We note one important caveat about this index. Among some countries and in some years, especially early ones,
the interest rate used for the calculation of the MI index is often constant throughout a year, making the annual
correlation of the interest rates between the home and base countries (corr(ii, ij) in the formula) undefined. Since we
treat the undefined corr the same as zero, it makes the MI index value 0.5. One may think that the policy interest
rate being constant (regardless of the base country’s interest rate) is a sign of monetary independence. However, it
can reflect the possibilities not only that (i) the home country’s monetary policy is independent from the base
country’s; but also (ii) the home country uses other tools to implement monetary policy than manipulating the
interest rates, such as changing the required reserve ratios and providing some window guidance (while leaving the
policy interest rate unchanged); and/or that (iii) the home country implements a strong control on financial
intermediary, including credit rationing, that makes the policy interest rate appear constant. To make the matter
more complicated, some countries have used (ii) and (iii) to exercise monetary independence while others have used
them while strictly following the base country’s monetary policy. The bottom line is that it is impossible to
incorporate these issues in the calculation of MI without over- or under-estimating the degree of monetary
independence. Therefore, assigning an MI value of 0.5 for such a case should be a reasonable compromise.
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ERS 

0.01
0.01  stdev((log(exch _ rate))

Merely applying this formula can easily create a downward bias in the index, that is, it would exaggerate
the “flexibility” of the exchange rate especially when the rate usually follows a narrow band, but is de- or
revalued infrequently.18 To avoid such downward bias, we also apply a threshold to the exchange rate
movement as has been done in the literature. That is, if the rate of monthly change in the exchange rate
stayed within +/-0.33 percent bands, we consider the exchange rate is “fixed” and assign the value of one
for the ERS index. Furthermore, single year pegs are dropped because they are quite possibly not
intentional ones.19 Higher values of this index indicate more stable movement of the exchange rate against
the currency of the base country.
Financial Openness/Integration (KAOPEN)
Without question, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account controls.20
Although many measures exist to describe the extent and intensity of capital account controls, it is
generally agreed that such measures fail to capture fully the complexity of real-world capital controls.
Nonetheless, for the measure of financial openness, we use the index of capital account openness, or
KAOPEN, by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008). KAOPEN is based on information regarding restrictions in the
International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER). Specifically, KAOPEN is the first standardized principal component of the variables that
indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, on capital
account transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds.21 Since KAOPEN is based
on reported restrictions, it is necessarily a de jure index of capital account openness (in contrast to de
facto measures such as those in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2002, 2007]). The choice of a de jure measure
of capital account openness is driven by the motivation to look into policy intentions of the countries; de
facto measures are more susceptible to other macroeconomic effects than solely policy decisions with
respect to capital controls.
The Chinn-Ito index is normalized between zero and one. Higher values of this index indicate that
a country is more open to cross-border capital transactions. The index is originally available for 181
countries for 1970 through 2006, and now updated to 2010. The data set we examine does not include the
United States because we consider the United States is the “Nth” country.
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In such a case, the average of the monthly change in the exchange rate would be so small that even small changes
could make the standard deviation big and thereby the ERS value small.
19
The choice of the +/-0.33 percent bands is based on the +/-2% band based on the annual rate, that is often used in
the literature. Also, to prevent breaks in the peg status due to one-time realignments, any exchange rate that had a
percentage change of 0 in 11 out of 12 months is considered fixed. When there are two re/devaluations in 3 months,
then they are considered to be one re/devaluation event, and if the remaining 10 months experience no exchange rate
movement, then that year is considered to be the year of fixed exchange rate. This way of defining the threshold for
the exchange rate is in line with the one adopted by Shambaugh (2004).
20
See Chinn and Ito (2008), Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), Edison et al. (2002), Henry (2007), and
Kose et al. (2006) for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions.
21
This index is described in greater detail in Chinn and Ito (2008).
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Figure 1: Degree of Policy Dispersions among Different Income Groups of Countries
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Figure 2: Deviations from the Means – Emerging Market Economies
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Figure 3: Deviations from the Means – Non-Emerging Market Developing Economies
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Figure 4: Degree of Policy Dispersions among Different Regional Country Groups
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Figure 7: Correlations between Policy Dispersion
and Output Volatility: EMG vs. Non-EMG since 1990
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Figure 5: Correlations between Policy Dispersion
and Output Volatility: EMG vs. Non-EMG
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Figure 8: Financially Open vs. Not Open
Since 1990
5-yr stand. dev. of per capita output growth
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1

5-yr stand. dev. of per capita output growth
0
.05
.1
.15
.2

Figure 6: Correlations between Policy Dispersion
and Output Volatility: Financially Open vs. Not Open

0

.2

.4
.6
Measure of policy dispersion

non-Open
Open

.8

1

0

non-Open fitted values
Open fitted values

.2

.4
Measure of policy dispersion

non-Open
Open

22

.6

non-Open fitted values
Open fitted values

.8

Figure 9: The “Diamond Charts”: Variation of the “Quadrilemma” Across Different Country Groups
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Figure 12 : EMGs with and without High IR Holding in 2005-09
Lithuania

5-yr stand. dev. of per capita output growth
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1

5-yr stand. dev. of per capita output growth
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1

Figure 10: EMGs with and without High IR Holding since 1990
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Figure 13 : EMGs with Open Financial Markets and with and
without High IR Holding in 2005-09
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Figure 11: EMGs w/ Open Financial Markets and High IR Holding
vs. those w/ Open Financial Market, but w/ Low IR Holdings
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